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CONSTRUCTING DEAL NETWORKS: BROKERS
AS NETWORK “ARCHITECTS” IN THE U.S. IPO







We introduce the concept of the network architect to extend theory explaining how
brokers create and manage structural holes in mediated markets. We argue that a
broker’s social resources and dependence on the market, along with exogenous deal
conditions, influence the broker’s motivations and willingness to make tradeoffs
between long-term and short-term considerations when constructing deal networks.
We develop our model and propositions in the context of the U.S. initial public
offerings market and then generalize these arguments to other market contexts.
Over the last twenty years, scholars have be-
come interested in how markets are socially
constructed. Researchers have focused on the
roles that cognition (e.g., Porac, Thomas, & Baden-
Fuller, 1989; Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton, &
Kanfer, 1995), institutional forces (e.g., Abolafia,
1996; Fligstein, 1996; Leblebici & Salancik, 1982),
and social structure (e.g., Burt, 1992; Granovet-
ter, 1985; Kenis & Knoke, 2002; Rao, Davis, &
Ward, 2000; Uzzi, 1996; White, 1981) play in shap-
ing market behavior. Within this literature,
scholars have given transaction networks a con-
siderable amount of attention (e.g., Baker, 1984;
Granovetter, 1985; Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1996; White,
1981). Their research has increased our under-
standing of how stable ongoing networks im-
pact market outcomes, such as firm survival,
terms of trade, and the exchange of information.
At the same time, however, researchers have
paid little attention to the fundamental question
of how a market network is actually constructed
for the purpose of carrying out one or more
transactions (Salancik, 1995). Salancik argues
that a network theory of organizations should
propose how networks of interactions achieve
collective and individual interests and how the
inclusion or exclusion of different actors influ-
ences network functioning. Similarly, Portes and
Sensenbrenner suggest that a theory of net-
works requires that “we must better specify how
social structure constrains, supports or derails
individual goal seeking behavior” (1993: 1325).
Within the literature on market networks, there
has been little research and theory on these
issues.
Burt’s (1992) notion of structural holes in net-
work organization provides an important start-
ing point for conceptualizing the strategic use of
network building to advance a given set of in-
terests. According to Burt, relational networks
often contain missing links that can be consid-
ered holes in the flow of information. A struc-
tural hole between two parties exists when the
parties do not attend to each other and, thus, do
not exchange information in the course of social
interaction. Burt suggests that the existence of
structural holes creates opportunities for third
parties to mediate the flow of information
among disconnected actors. Burt (2000) reviewed
a large amount of recent evidence showing that
market advantages, such as increased profits,
survival, and innovation, accrue both to the so-
called informational brokers who bridge struc-
tural holes and to the individuals, groups, or
organizations that they bring together in the
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course of their brokering activities. Burt’s review
highlights, in a convincing manner, the impor-
tant role that structural holes—and the brokers
who span them—play in market networks.
The informational role of the broker in market
networks is perhaps most apparent in mediated
markets, such as real estate transactions and
the buying and selling of financial securities. In
all such markets, buyers and sellers interact
with each other through an intermediary market
maker whose formal role is to bridge the buyer-
seller informational interface (e.g., Abolafia,
1996; Baker, 1984; Finlay & Coverdill, 2000; Halp-
ern, 1996; Khurana, 2002). Transaction intermedi-
aries such as brokers, underwriters, and agents
arise in markets where the search costs associ-
ated with identifying potential transaction part-
ners are high, where opportunism can easily run
rampant, and where buyers often require steep
price discounts to compensate for the risks they
must absorb by participating in a deal (Abola-
fia, 1996). Brokers help to manage these risks
and, in return, capture a percentage of the
resources that are exchanged in the form of
commissions, brokerage fees, retainers, or even
the opportunity to participate in a transaction
themselves.
As Finlay and Coverdill (2000) note, however,
while research on structural holes provides a
solid foundation for theorizing about brokers,
market mediators are more than bridging con-
duits that facilitate the flow of information be-
tween buyers and sellers through their advan-
taged network position. Not all structural holes
are equivalent and equally attractive. They vary
in a number of ways, and it is the job of the
broker to respond to these variations by “pack-
aging” viable configurations of network actors.
Moreover, brokers often strategically create
structural holes through the selective accumula-
tion and exploitation of social resources. Thus,
brokers are network “architects” who actively
design, build, and maintain transactional net-
works through their own strategic and profit-
driven activities. These activities extend the
brokering role beyond a purely structural posi-
tion and transform it into a complex and multi-
dimensional market function (e.g., Finlay &
Coverdill, 2000; Khurana, 2002).
Despite its theoretical and economic signifi-
cance, this proactive and constitutive aspect of
brokering has not been theorized adequately.
Aside from the literature on structural holes,
existing studies of brokering consist mainly of
descriptive accounts of broker activities in very
specific market contexts, such as securities trad-
ing (e.g., Abolafia, 1996), employee recruiting
(Finlay & Coverdill, 2000; Khurana, 2002), real
estate (Halpern, 1996), leisure travel (Reimer,
1990), and cocoa exporting (Southall, 1978).
These descriptive accounts have illustrated how
the brokering role is complicated by and embed-
ded within the idiosyncrasies of each market
situation. The scholarly challenge is to develop
theory that accommodates these idiosyncrasies,
while still providing general principles for un-
derstanding the proactive and network-building
role of brokers in meditated markets.
We suggest that three key factors are impor-
tant in determining how the role of network ar-
chitect plays out during the brokering process:
(1) the stock of social resources the broker has
accumulated from previously successful trans-
actions that can be brought to bear on a current
transaction, (2) the broker’s dependence on the
focal market as a source of profits, and (3) the
various exogenous conditions in which a deal
takes place. These three factors are interdepen-
dent, but each is vital in controlling the motiva-
tions of the broker in a mediated transaction.
The exogenous conditions of the deal, including
such factors as the current economic climate,
availability of alternatives, and the quality of
the assets offered for exchange, impact the ini-
tial favorability of the deal and, thus, influence
how easy or difficult it is for the broker to recruit
buyers and sellers into the transaction network.
A broker’s accumulated social resources affect
the broker’s motivational leverage in persuad-
ing, enticing, and/or cajoling buyers and sellers
to consummate a deal. Finally, a broker’s de-
pendence on the focal market as a source of
profits influences the broker’s risk profile and
relative focus on short- versus long-term trad-
ing considerations.
Our primary purpose in this paper is to extend
theory on brokering by explicating the joint in-
fluence of these three factors on how brokers
configure transactional networks in mediated
markets. Because the conditions of brokering
are so closely tied to specific market situations,
it is difficult to theorize about brokering in the
abstract. To help concretize our arguments, we
situate our discussion within the context of the
U.S. market for initial public offerings (IPOs), an
important mediated market that controls the al-
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location of billions of dollars each year. In the
market for IPOs, the network structure of trans-
actions changes from deal to deal, and the role
of the broker, or network architect, is played by
the lead investment bank underwriting each of-
fering. Our key claim is that deal conditions,
underwriter social resources, and underwriter
dependence on the IPO market come together
within individual stock offerings to shape how
the lead underwriter adjusts the attributes of the
transactional network that takes a company
public. These latter network characteristics then
help to determine important outcomes of the
deal—specifically, the initial price of the shares
offered for sale and their allocation among
investors.
A secondary purpose of this article is to ex-
plore how social and economic motivations mu-
tually shape the structure and functioning of
market networks. These two categories of moti-
vations are sometimes positioned in the litera-
ture as representing opposing logics of action
that are mutually exclusive. However, the micro-
processes of IPO brokering make it clear that
economic and social motivations are inter-
twined in complex and interdependent ways.
Brokers are effective when they strike an accept-
able balance between the economic interests of
buyers and sellers and their own profit objec-
tives. Because preferences are often hard to de-
cipher ex ante, and because there are inherent
conflicts involved in most strictly distributive
contexts, the task of brokering is neither easy
nor programmable.
Much research suggests that, under condi-
tions of market uncertainty, social variables
such as actor status and familiarity provide use-
ful information to market participants and lubri-
cate exchange processes that could otherwise
bog down in claims, counterclaims, and protec-
tive maneuvering (e.g., Geertz, 1978; Haunschild,
1994; Podolny, 1994; Powell, 1985; Uzzi, 1997). Me-
diated markets in general and the IPO market
specifically are, thus, excellent venues for theo-
rizing about how economic and social processes
come together in the consummation of particu-
lar deals.
To accomplish these objectives, we first de-
scribe the general structure of IPO deal net-
works. Not all elements of these networks are
controlled by the lead underwriter, and many
participants act as background constraints that
only indirectly influence an underwriter’s bro-
kering activities. We label the portion of a deal
network that is constructed by the lead under-
writer the deal network kernel, and we enumer-
ate the actors who are typically included within it.
We follow this discussion with the develop-
ment of propositions explaining how under-
writer dependence and underwriter social re-
sources influence key attributes of deal network
kernels under “typical” or “average” deal condi-
tions. We then elaborate this argument by con-
sidering how positive and negative variations
away from typical deal conditions are reflected
in adjustments to deal kernels. This is followed
by propositions that link the characteristics of
IPO kernels to variations in an offering’s price
and share allocations.
After describing these relationships in the IPO
market, we then generalize our approach by dis-
cussing how each of these factors is important
in the brokering processes of other mediated
markets. In this way, we use the IPO market as
a bridge linking the concepts of social re-
sources, dependence, and deal conditions to
brokering processes within mediated markets in
general. We finish by suggesting potentially
fruitful directions for future research on broker-
ing in mediated markets.
THE IPO DEAL NETWORK KERNEL
The IPO market is an often studied mediated
market, and previous researchers have explored
the role of various parties in shaping IPO out-
comes. In addition to the underwriter (Carter &
Manaster, 1990; Megginson & Weiss, 1995;
Michaely & Shaw, 1994; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels,
1999), researchers have examined the impact of
auditors (Balvers, McDonald, & Miller, 1988;
Beatty, 1989), venture capitalists (Brav &
Gompers, 1997; Gompers, 1996; Lerner, 1994), and
alliance partners (Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Stuart
et al., 1999) on IPO valuation and performance.
In all of these studies, researchers have relied
primarily on signaling theory (Spence, 1974) to
examine how the reputation of different partici-
pants in the IPO process can reduce information
asymmetries between the offering firm and in-
vestors, and thus increase the price investors
are willing to pay for an IPO stock.
A potentially more fruitful approach is to view
IPOs as transient deal networks in which cer-
tain parties are brought together for a limited
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period of time to take a company public.1 With a
few exceptions (e.g., Hanley & Wilhelm, 1995;
Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Wolfe, Cooperman, &
Ferris, 1994), scholars have not addressed how
deal networks are actually constructed, and
there has been little research on the brokering
process through which the lead underwriter
manages a transaction. The lead underwriter
fills a critical role in an IPO deal network by
recruiting investors and other underwriters to
participate in the offering. It is this portion of the
total IPO deal network that is directly within the
underwriter’s sphere of influence and that forms
the core—the kernel—of an IPO deal network.
Figure 1 depicts a hypothetical IPO deal net-
work, and the shaded area represents the deal
network kernel.
The lead underwriter is linked directly to
some, but not all, of the investors participating
in an offering. The vast majority of offerings are
syndicated, which means that other investment
banks are recruited to help distribute shares.
The lead underwriter, thus, is also linked to
other underwriters, who are connected to addi-
tional investors who similarly participate in the
offering. Syndicates are used to reduce the risk
and cost of an offering by distributing shares
over several investment banks. Although many
underwriters today can absorb the cost and risk
of IPOs, syndicates are still used to broaden the
distribution of shares, ensure client access to
shares of IPOs led by other banks, and allow the
lead underwriter to take advantage of differ-
ences in the social resources of other banks so
as to manage the outcomes of the offering
more effectively.
Other actors outside the kernel, such as audi-
tors, venture capitalists, and board members,
are also important, but their relationships to the
offering firm typically exist prior to retaining the
lead underwriter. Although some of these non-
kernel actors may influence the outcomes of an
offering independent of the underwriter, they
are not directly involved in the construction of
the deal network kernel itself.
In addition, although individual investors
form a small part of the investor network in a
typical IPO, institutional investors purchase the
overwhelming majority of IPO shares (Hanley &
Wilhelm, 1995). Individual investor participation
in multiple offerings is more ad hoc and has less
impact than institutional investor participation.
For these reasons, we focus only on an under-
writer’s recruitment of institutional investors
into the network kernel, and we do not consider
1 The appendix provides a detailed description of the pro-
cess of taking a company public.
FIGURE 1
The IPO Deal Network
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the roles that these other actors play in the IPO
process.
By including or excluding investors and syn-
dicate members with different sets of character-
istics, the lead underwriter can alter the config-
uration of a network kernel and, with it, the
course of a transaction. Prior research on mar-
kets (e.g., Baker, 1984, 1990; Carter & Dark, 1993;
Carter & Manaster, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; Uzzi,
1996, 1999) suggests that four characteristics of
deal network kernels are particularly important
in shaping IPO outcomes: (1) the size of the net-
work kernel, as defined by the number of inves-
tors recruited to participate in the deal; (2) the
proportion of investors who have close and re-
peated ties to the lead underwriter or syndicate
members; (3) the proportion of investors with a
long-term investment horizon who are willing to
retain a company’s stock in the face of short-
term performance downturns; and (4) the heter-
ogeneity of the underwriting syndicate with
respect to the syndicate members’ social re-
sources in the IPO market.
Each of these network attributes, singly and in
combination, provides a lead underwriter with a
series of tradeoffs in designing IPO network ker-
nels. Large kernels, for example, are effective in
spreading the risk of an offering across many
investors and syndicate members, and they can
also be used to build new relationships with
investors and/or banks with whom the under-
writer has had little prior experience. However,
large kernels are harder to construct and man-
age, thus increasing transaction costs, as well
as the possibility of buyer opportunism and/or
stock price volatility.
In like fashion, kernels consisting of many
investors who have close ties to the lead under-
writer provide a measure of controllability to the
underwriter, who can leverage past obligations
to influence a current transaction. However,
overreliance on past trading relationships in-
creases information redundancy in the kernel,
as well as the underwriter’s dependence on a
small set of regular customers. Understanding
and managing tradeoffs such as these are im-
portant components of the lead underwriter’s
competence in taking companies public.
The specific choices that an underwriter
makes determine the fate of a new offering by
influencing the price the company receives for
its shares and how the shares are allocated
among investors. The initial pricing of the stock
determines the amount of capital the company
receives from the offering to finance its contin-
ued growth and development. This price, as well
as the price fluctuations that occur once the
stock begins trading on the open market, also
sends powerful signals to investors, customers,
suppliers, and business partners about the
strength and viability of the company (Ben-
veniste & Spindt, 1989; Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995;
Welch, 1989).
The allocation of shares is important, because
the concentration of shares in the hands of few
or many investors affects both investor influ-
ence over the firm and the ongoing stability of
the stock price. Stock price volatility is an im-
portant signal to stakeholders, and indepen-
dence from investors influences the company’s
relative focus on long-term and short-term per-
formance (Bushee, 1998; Carter & Dark, 1993;
Krigman, Shaw, & Womack, 1999). Given their
impact on IPO outcomes, it is thus necessary to
unpack the choices underwriters make in con-
structing deal network kernels and to detail the
factors that influence these choices. It is to this
task that we now turn.
CONSTRUCTING AN IPO DEAL
NETWORK KERNEL
Since both IPO buyers and sellers are clients,
the underwriter has a fiduciary responsibility to
represent their opposing needs equally, al-
though the underwriter retains broad discretion
in determining how these needs are met. The
underwriter’s own motivations are important in
this regard. As Figure 2 illustrates, the under-
writer is faced with a tension between long-term
and short-term considerations. Like buyers and
sellers, the underwriter has a profit motive and
seeks to reap higher commissions from an offer-
ing. Underwriting fees are a direct function of
the selling price. However, underwriters also
want to build and maintain a strong reputation
and good relationships with the investor com-
munity so as not to impair their ability to suc-
cessfully place offerings in the future (Abolafia,
1996). Thus, underwriters have long-term self-
protective as well as short-term profit motivations.
Our key argument is that specific tradeoffs
between an underwriter’s long- and short-term
motivations in a given deal will be a function of
the social resources the underwriter has avail-
able for managing the deal, the underwriter’s
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dependence on this market, and the favorability
of the deal conditions. These tradeoffs are then
manifested in specific design choices made by
the underwriter in constructing a deal network
kernel.
Social Resources, Market Dependence, and
Deal Conditions: Basic Definitions
Social resources. In prior research scholars
have identified two social resources that are
particularly valuable to actors for managing
their position in a network: (1) actors’ general-
ized reputations as reliable and competent net-
work members (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Bro-
miley, 1993; Fombrun, 1996; Weigelt & Camerer,
1988; Wilson, 1985) and (2) the relationships that
actors have accumulated over time with other
network members via past interactions (Baker,
1984; Granovetter, 1985; Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1996).2
With respect to reputation, the public reputa-
tion of investment banks has long played an
important role in stabilizing transactions when
investment uncertainty is high. Prior to the Se-
curities Acts of 1933 and 1934, a successful secu-
rities offering of any significant size required
the participation of a highly reputable under-
writer (Chernow, 1997; Hayes, 1970). Since other
information on the prospects of a company go-
ing public was generally unavailable, the will-
ingness of the bank to risk its reputation was an
important signal about the quality of the offer-
ing. Despite today’s greater availability of fi-
nancial information, recent research suggests
that an investment bank’s reputation still influ-
ences its ability to generate underwriting busi-
ness and place offerings successfully (Carter &
Dark, 1993; Eccles & Crane, 1988; Podolny, 1994;
Stuart et al., 1999; Wolfe et al., 1994).
With respect to network ties, the number of
embedded relationships the underwriter has to
draw on is another important market-making
social resource. Research suggests that market
relationships vary along a continuum, from
those that are instrumental and “arm’s length”
to those that are “embedded” in dense social
interactions that promote trust and cooperation
2 We recognize that underwriters possess other resources
beyond their reputations and networks of relationships. The
amount of financial capital they possess, for example, can
be another powerful resource in market-making activities.
However, the vast majority of IPOs are “firm commitment”
offerings (i.e., the bank agrees to buy the entire offering from
the company at the initial price, thereby absorbing any risk
that the offering will not be fully subscribed); therefore, as
long as the underwriter has the resources necessary to pur-
chase the offering, its capital does not play a significant role
in the portion of the process we discuss in this article. In
addition, since the majority of offerings are syndicated, the
lead underwriter generally does not bear the cost of pur-
chasing the shares alone. The capital strength of the under-
writer is more important when considering the role the un-
derwriter plays in supporting the stock in the secondary
market (e.g., Ellis, Michaely, & O’Hara, 2000), but these ac-
tivities are beyond the scope of our discussion.
FIGURE 2
Factors Impacting Underwriter Motivations
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(Granovetter, 1985). The degree to which rela-
tionships are either embedded or arm’s length
seems to depend on the frequency (e.g., Baker,
1984; Granovetter, 1985; White, 1981) and concen-
tration (e.g., Baker, 1990; Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1996)
of past and current transactions between the
actors involved. The greater the frequency and
the larger the proportion of transactions that are
concentrated within a set of actors, the more
socially embedded the transactional relation-
ships are. Evidence suggests that embedded re-
lationships decrease opportunistic behavior
(Uzzi, 1996, 1997), facilitate information transfer
(Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1996), influence the acquisi-
tion and use of power (Baker, 1990), reduce costs
(Uzzi, 1999), build trust between the transaction
partners (Uzzi, 1997), and reduce market volatil-
ity (Baker, 1984).
These reputational and relational resources
can partially substitute for one another. Re-
peated interactions over multiple transactions
provide valuable information about an actor’s
competence and trustworthiness as a transac-
tion partner (Uzzi, 1996; Wilson, 1985). However,
participants in a transaction do not always have
prior experience working with one another. An
actor’s generalized reputation can serve as a
valuable proxy for prior experience and reduce
some of the uncertainties about the transaction
(Bromiley, 1993; Fombrun, 1996).
If a bank has a strong reputation, an investor
may be more willing to participate in the bank’s
offering and to accept claims the bank makes
about the quality of the company, even if the
investor has not transacted with the bank previ-
ously. In opposite fashion, if a bank does not
enjoy a strong reputation in the IPO market but
does have embedded ties with investors, per-
haps through other types of deals, it can draw on
these relationships to promote a particular
stock.
These substitutabilities aside, higher com-
bined levels of an underwriter’s social resources
afford the underwriter greater flexibility in man-
aging the characteristics of investors and syndi-
cate members within the deal network kernel.
Whether underwriters choose to exploit this
flexibility is another matter.
Market dependence. Prior research has shown
that the number of different financial markets in
which a bank participates can be useful in un-
derstanding variations in bank behavior (Eccles
& Crane, 1988). As resource dependence theory
suggests, greater or lesser dependence on a par-
ticular resource in a bank’s task environment
has important implications for how the bank
manages those resources (e.g., Baker, 1990; Pfef-
fer & Salancik, 1978). To the extent that a bank is
financially dependent on the IPO market, it will
be more sensitive to conditions that could cause
long-term damage to the integrity of the offering
process. It will also be more concerned with
cultivating and expanding the social resources
it has developed in the context of this market so
as to become a more powerful player and, if not
reduce its own dependence, increase the depen-
dence of others on it.
The largest and most well-known investment
banks, such as Morgan Stanley, Goldman
Sachs, and Credit Suisse First Boston, are ac-
tively involved in a variety of markets, and IPOs
represent only a small proportion of their reve-
nues, even though they underwrite IPOs on a
regular basis. Because their social resources
and profits are generated in a wide range of
financial markets, these banks are less depen-
dent on IPO brokering than smaller banks that
specialize in taking companies public. This lat-
ter group of underwriters includes such firms as
Alex. Brown & Sons, Hambrecht & Quist, and
Montgomery Securities.3 These banks derive a
larger percentage of their profits from IPOs and
have generated substantial social resources
that are quite specific to their IPO underwriting
activities. Finally, a third group of banks fo-
cuses on other types of financial transactions or
serves primarily as retail stock brokers. These
banks participate in the IPO market as lead
underwriters the least frequently. Examples in-
clude A.G. Edwards, Piper Jaffray, and Pennsyl-
vania Merchant’s Group. Because such banks do
not derive a substantial proportion of their so-
cial resources and revenues from the IPO mar-
ket, they are less dependent than both the large
and more specialized banks on IPO underwriting.
Deal conditions. An underwriter does not have
complete freedom to broker IPO outcomes. Even
3 During the course of developing this article, several of
the banks used as examples were acquired by larger enti-
ties and, in some cases, shut down after the IPO market
crash in 2001–2002. We continue to offer these banks as
examples because their names are still widely recognized in
the IPO market context, and because any empirical research
on the IPO market still needs to take these banks—and their
characteristics as we have described them—into account.
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though the brokering process is an attempt to
balance interests across the deal network, each
offering has exogenously determined character-
istics that independently influence the final out-
comes of a deal and make it easier or more
difficult to sell the stock. These conditions im-
pact the underwriter’s brokering activities sig-
nificantly. Under favorable deal conditions, the
underwriter occupies an advantaged gate-
keeper position, rationing a scarce and high-
demand commodity to a large pool of willing
investors. Under unfavorable deal conditions,
however, the underwriter serves as an enthusi-
astic recruiter, convincing wary investors that it
is worthwhile for them to participate in a trans-
action that may have certain undesirable prop-
erties. Two aspects of deal conditions that are
especially important are the quality of the firm
being taken public and the general market con-
ditions present at the time of the IPO.
With respect to firm quality, current research
on IPOs suggests that factors such as the in-
volvement of a reputable venture capitalist (Jain
& Kini, 2000), the presence of prominent board
members (Stuart et al., 1999), and well-devel-
oped organizational practices for managing the
firm’s human capital (Welbourne & Andrews,
1996) enhance the value and quality of a new
offering. Other factors such as an innovative
product, an experienced management team, and
a history of profitability also influence the de-
sirability of an offering in the eyes of investors
(Gutterman, 1991).
Although banks try to underwrite the best-
quality companies they can, company quality is
sometimes equivocal. For example, a bank may
discover unanticipated problems with a com-
pany once it has already agreed to underwrite
the offering. Or competitors may introduce a
new product that threatens an IPO firm’s pros-
pects once the offering has begun. A bank also
may agree to underwrite a less attractive offer-
ing if doing so leads to a future benefit. For
example, a bank might agree to underwrite the
IPO of a weaker company funded by a particular
venture capitalist to increase the probability
that the bank will attract future offerings of
higher quality from the same financier.
Over and above the factors that determine
firm quality, particular industries—and even the
IPO market in general—can quickly go in and
out of favor with investors (Ibbotson & Jaffe,
1975; Ritter, 1984). When conditions are favor-
able, researchers have shown that companies
are taken public at higher valuations, and com-
panies of more uncertain quality are brought to
market more easily (Ritter, 1984). When markets
cool, however, many IPOs are postponed or
withdrawn, and only the strongest offerings are
pursued. Recent examples of such changes in
market conditions can be found in the downturn
between July and October of 1998 and the crash
in the internet IPO segment that began in April
2000. In both cases, otherwise robust IPO mar-
kets came to a screeching halt when market
conditions and investor preferences shifted.
Even promising companies can have poorly
performing IPOs if market conditions change
unexpectedly.
An underwriter’s social resources and depen-
dence on the IPO market, as well as the favor-
ability of deal conditions, all impact the design
of the deal network kernel. Figure 3 summarizes
the key causal influences in network kernel de-
sign. An underwriter manages the construction
of the deal network kernel by pursuing a partic-
ular combination of kernel size, proportions of
long-term and embedded investors, and hetero-
geneity of the underwriter syndicate. The lead
underwriter then recruits investors with the de-
sired characteristics, as well as underwriter
syndicate members who have access to these
particular types of investors. By including or
excluding investors with different sets of char-
acteristics, the underwriter shapes the deal net-
work kernel and, with it, influences the valua-
tion of the offering and the allocation of shares.
We now turn to developing propositions that
account for variations in kernel design and
transaction outcomes.
The Impact of Social Resources on Deal
Network Design4
Who holds a company’s stock and how long
they hold it influence the success of an IPO.
Successful offerings are those that do not result
4 It is not surprising that underwriters possessing the
greatest amounts of social resources will have more embed-
ded ties in their deal networks, on average, than underwrit-
ers with fewer social resources. We therefore do not develop
propositions about this relationship in this section but,
rather, view the relationship as a background assumption.
We do, however, develop propositions about embedded ties
when discussing market dependence and deal conditions.
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in wild gyrations in stock price but, rather, lead
to steady price increases over time (Gutterman,
1991; Krigman et al., 1999). In order to achieve
this outcome, it is important for underwriters to
sell shares of stock to investors who will hold
the stock rather than “flip” it to capture a short-
term gain. Krigman et al. (1999) found that IPOs
with low flipping rates enjoyed abnormal re-
turns of 1.5 percent a month for the first six
months of trading. Heavy trading increases
stock price volatility and, thus, increases its per-
ceived investment risk. This risk, in turn, can
limit a company’s ability to raise additional
capital through a subsequent offering (Ben-
veniste, Erdal, & Wilhelm, 1998; Welch, 1989).
Although some short-term investors are neces-
sary to ensure the liquidity and price apprecia-
tion of an offering, placing stock in the hands of
long-term investors is an important brokering
strategy for increasing market perceptions of
the quality of both the IPO and its underwriter.
Long-term investors are valuable and scarce
customers, however, and not all underwriters
have equal access to them. Underwriters with
larger stocks of social resources enjoy greater
access to long-term investors, because their
prior dealings in the IPO market afford them
many opportunities for developing close rela-
tionships with such investors. In addition, their
generalized positive reputation as underwriters
acts as a signal for the long-term viability of an
offering.
The signaling effect of underwriter reputation
has been shown to be especially important in
recruiting long-term investors (Gulati & Higgins,
2003). Carter and Dark (1993), for example, ob-
served that highly reputable underwriters led
offerings with less short-term flipping. One can
infer from this result that the highly reputable
underwriters in their sample were more able to
recruit long-term investors into their deal net-
work kernels. We therefore suggest the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 1: The greater the social
resources of the lead underwriter, the
higher the proportion of long-term in-
vestors included in a deal network
kernel.
The underwriting syndicate is another mech-
anism that the lead underwriter uses to manage
the types of investors included in the deal net-
work kernel. The key motivation for using a syn-
dicate of other banks is to broaden the distribu-
tion of shares to ensure a mix of long-term and
short-term investors, as well as investors with
FIGURE 3
Underwriter Interests and the Construction of the IPO Deal Network Kernel
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ties of varying strength to the underwriters.
Completely homogenous networks are usually
poor design choices because, at one extreme,
they constrain market liquidity and, at the other
extreme, generate excessive pricing volatility.
Establishing relationships with varied investors
takes time and resources, however, and even the
most reputable and largest banks do not have
complete coverage of the market. This makes
underwriting syndicates useful in constructing
the deal network kernel. Different kinds of in-
vestments banks have different portfolios of cli-
ents, and by including a range of investment
banks in a deal kernel, the lead underwriter can
adjust the characteristics of the kernel in ways
appropriate for a given deal.
At the same time, underwriters vary in their
ability to recruit syndicate members, and an
asymmetry exists in this regard between banks
with high and low social resources. While all
underwriters will be able to recruit syndicate
members with low social resources, banks with
higher social resources have more degrees of
freedom in syndicate construction. Lead under-
writers prefer to include at least some banks of
similar or higher social resources in their syndi-
cates. Podolny (1994), for example, found that
deals in the bond market involving high-status
banks reduce uncertainties, enhance the lead
underwriter’s own reputation, and provide
greater access to desirable offerings. Thus, un-
derwriters can benefit both socially and finan-
cially by including banks with substantial so-
cial resources in their deal networks.
Underwriters with limited social resources
would also prefer to include such banks in their
deal networks for these same reasons. They are
unlikely to do so, however, because their posi-
tion at the periphery of the IPO market con-
strains their ability to recruit high-status banks.
The underwriting syndicates for banks with low
social resources will therefore consist primarily
of other similarly resource-constrained banks.
Proposition 2: The greater the social
resources of the lead underwriter, the
greater the social resource heteroge-
neity of the underwriting syndicate.
The Impact of Market Dependence on Deal
Network Design
An underwriter’s dependence on the IPO mar-
ket as a source of profits influences its willing-
ness to exploit investors in this market for short-
term gains. An important consideration for the
underwriter is whether to include investors in a
deal network with whom it has done substantial
business in the past or to include new investors
with whom it has only an arm’s length relation-
ship (Granovetter, 1985). Even though there are a
number of benefits associated with constructing
highly embedded deal network kernels (e.g.,
Baker, 1984; Uzzi, 1996, 1997), such networks can
also make it difficult to gather new information
from the environment (Burt, 1992; Uzzi, 1996,
1999). In addition, working exclusively and re-
peatedly with the same investors increases an
underwriter’s dependence on those investors
and weakens the underwriter’s ability to nego-
tiate effectively (Baker, 1990; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). Finally, because of the positive expecta-
tions that surround embedded relationships,
any negative outcomes from a deal may be am-
plified and communicated throughout the mar-
ket, thus detracting from a bank’s reputation as
a reliable and trustworthy intermediary be-
tween buyers and sellers.
An underwriter’s dependence on the IPO mar-
ket impacts the tradeoffs it makes regarding
these concerns. Since dependent underwriters
do not possess the diverse range of profit
sources that a presence in multiple markets pro-
vides, they will be more risk averse when it
comes to constructing their IPO deal network
kernels. It is to the dependent bank’s advantage
to have greater variety in the types of relation-
ships composing its IPO deal networks and to be
more aggressive in recruiting new institutional
investors into its deals, even though doing so
increases the risk that arm’s length investors
will act opportunistically.
In prior research on strategic alliances, Row-
ley, Behrens, and Krackhardt (2000) found that
strong ties are beneficial to performance when
the environment demands a high degree of ex-
ploitation, whereas weak ties are beneficial for
exploration purposes. Extrapolating this reason-
ing to the IPO context suggests that dependent
underwriters who feel greater pressure to en-
gage in exploration for new network resources
include a greater proportion of arm’s length ties
in their deal networks than less dependent un-
derwriters, who are content to make use of their
current network resources. In order to minimize
the risks associated with having a higher pro-
portion of arm’s length ties in the deal network,
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dependent underwriters also construct larger
deal networks in terms of both investors and
syndicate members so that they reduce their
exposure to opportunistic behavior by any one
investor (Baker, 1990).
Proposition 3: The greater the lead un-
derwriter’s financial dependence on
the IPO market, the lower the propor-
tion of embedded ties in a deal net-
work kernel.
Proposition 4: The greater the lead un-
derwriter’s financial dependence on
the IPO market, the greater the size of
a deal network kernel.
Taken together, these two propositions can be
used to derive an important implication of un-
derwriter dependence on deal network kernels.
Large and diversified banks such as Goldman
Sachs and Credit Suisse First Boston are in-
volved in a wide variety of financial markets
and tend to lead IPOs selectively (Beatty & Rit-
ter, 1986; Wolfe et al., 1994). Propositions 3 and 4
suggest that these banks approach the IPO mar-
ket with less concern for expanding their rela-
tional base and spend less time recruiting new
investors into their deals than more dependent
specialist underwriters, such as Hambrecht &
Quist and Alex. Brown & Sons. Consequently,
the deal network kernels of large and diversi-
fied banks will generally be more compact than
specialist kernels, and include a higher percent-
age of investors with whom the banks have de-
veloped long-standing relationships. Paradoxi-
cally, then, our arguments imply that while
larger and diversified underwriters are less de-
pendent than specialists on the IPO market as a
source of profits, they become more dependent
on a smaller set of investors to place their IPOs.
This paradox between global and local de-
pendence is a double-edged sword for IPO bro-
kering processes. As noted above, compact and
embedded networks have consequences that
vary in their desirability. A small portfolio of
close and regular investors provides a ready-
made outlet for the diversified underwriter in-
terested in creating a favorable market for an
offering. However, strongly embedded network
kernels propagate expectations and opportuni-
ties for reciprocity that can lead underwriters
and investors to lose their bargaining objectiv-
ity over time and, in the extreme, to stretch in-
stitutional rules that have been enacted to en-
sure fair play and impartiality. They also create
greater potential for opportunistic behaviors by
the underwriter as the embedded investors be-
come more dependent on the bank. This may
explain why some large and diversified banks
engaged in self-serving behaviors such as so-
called tying arrangements and investor kick-
backs of profits from IPOs during the late 1990s,
and why specialized banks were less likely to
follow suit (Labate & Luce, 2001; SEC vs. Credit
Suisse First Boston, 2002).
Both large underwriters and specialists pos-
sess the substantial social resources necessary
to engage in these activities. However, our ar-
guments suggest that, because of their depen-
dence on the IPO market, specialists are less
likely to risk their social capital by engaging in
potentially exploitive behaviors that enhance
their short-term profits, even when market con-
ditions make this sort of behavior possible.
The Impact of Deal Conditions on Deal
Network Design
Propositions 1 through 4 describe IPO deal
networks for “average” firm and market condi-
tions. However, variations in either firm quality
or market favorability significantly influence
the difficulty of building a deal network kernel.
They also influence the underwriter’s motiva-
tion to protect and grow its social resources
(Bromiley, 1993; Wilson, 1985). For both of these
reasons, deal conditions are an important exog-
enous influence on a lead underwriter’s broker-
ing activities, making it more or less likely that
the underwriter recruits embedded transaction
partners, long-term investors, and different
kinds of syndicate members as participants.
When IPO deal conditions are favorable, an
offering is an opportunity to expand an under-
writer’s social resources through allocations of
shares to desirable long-term investors with
whom the underwriter has not transacted in the
past. Given the likelihood that an attractive of-
fering will perform well over the long term, an
underwriter generates goodwill with new long-
term investors, thus making it more likely that
the investor will participate in the underwriter’s
future deals. At the same time, these positive
effects enhance the underwriter’s reputation
(Hayes, 1970; Wilson, 1985). Finally, IPOs that are
attractive to investors are also going to be at-
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tractive to other underwriters who would like to
gain access to the offering for their own clients.
The lead underwriter will therefore use the op-
portunity afforded by favorable deal conditions
to recruit more underwriters with substantial
social resources into their deal networks. Doing
so not only enhances the performance of the
offering but also creates obligations that can
provide the underwriter with access to the
shares of attractive IPOs led by the other banks.
Thus, highly favorable conditions lead to larger
deal network kernels with larger proportions of
long-term investors, smaller proportions of em-
bedded ties with investors, and less underwriter
syndicate heterogeneity.
Brokering dynamics are substantially differ-
ent for unfavorable deal conditions, although
the resulting deal network size and embedded-
ness are similar to those observed in highly
favorable deal conditions. Underwriters per-
ceive unfavorable deal conditions as a threat to
their market-making resources. Rather then re-
cruit long-term investors with whom they have
embedded relationships, underwriters are more
likely to involve short-term and arm’s length
investors who are of less interest to them as
future transaction partners. Since these inves-
tors are not part of their ongoing deal networks,
underwriters are less concerned about any dam-
age to the relationship from a poorly performing
IPO.
At the same time, short-term, arm’s length in-
vestors are risky and potentially volatile in their
trading behavior. Lead underwriters expand the
size of the deal network to minimize this risk by
increasing the number of short-term investors
and by including more banks with fewer social
resources in the underwriting syndicate. The
above reasoning suggests a number of interac-
tive causal relationships.
Proposition 5: Lead underwriters will
construct larger deal network kernels
when deal conditions are highly fa-
vorable or highly unfavorable, com-
pared to average deal conditions.
Proposition 6: Lead underwriters will
include a higher proportion of inves-
tors with whom they have arm’s
length relationships in their deal net-
work kernels when deal conditions
are highly favorable or highly unfa-
vorable, compared to average deal
conditions.
Proposition 7: Lead underwriters will
include a higher proportion of long-
term investors in their deal network
kernels when deal conditions are
highly favorable, and a higher propor-
tion of short-term investors when deal
conditions are highly unfavorable,
compared to average deal conditions.
Proposition 8: Lead underwriters will
decrease underwriter syndicate heter-
ogeneity when deal conditions are
highly favorable, and will increase
syndicate heterogeneity when deal
conditions are highly unfavorable,
compared to average deal conditions.
While the above effects are general tenden-
cies evident across a variety of deal conditions,
they do not apply to all lead underwriters
equally. In fact, the influence of deal conditions
on IPO deal network kernels is complicated by a
bank’s social resources and market dependence,
and banks can be arrayed along these two di-
mensions by their sensitivity to deal conditions.
This differential sensitivity is important be-
cause it influences a bank’s tendency to adjust
network kernel properties in response to varia-
tions in deal quality. This is clearest in the case
of banks such as Pennsylvania Merchants
Group and Whale Securities who possess lim-
ited social resources in the IPO market and who
act as lead underwriters for IPOs only infre-
quently. Because these banks have fewer social
resources at risk when a deal goes awry, and
because they are not highly dependent on IPOs
as a source of profits, they are less responsive
than other banks to deal conditions. Conse-
quently, the deal network kernels constructed
by these banks exhibit less systematic varia-
tion across deal conditions than those con-
structed by either large diversified or specialist
underwriters.
Similarly, large diversified banks are less de-
pendent on the IPO market than specialists, and
they rely on a smaller portfolio of regular inves-
tors to place their offerings. Thus, the deal net-
work kernels constructed by large diversified
banks will typically exhibit less variance from
deal to deal than those constructed by specialists.
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In short, different combinations of market de-
pendence and social resources serve to amplify
or dampen sensitivity to deal conditions. Be-
cause of their unique combination of high mar-
ket dependence and substantial social re-
sources, specialist underwriters are most likely
to use their degrees of freedom to adjust kernel
designs in response to the quality of an offering.
IPO Transaction Outcomes
Two transaction outcomes are most affected
by the structure of an IPO deal network kernel:
(1) the initial “primary market” price set for the
stock by the underwriter and the IPO firm and (2)
the initial allocation of shares among investors.
Once an IPO stock begins “secondary market”
trading on a national exchange, the associated
performance outcomes, such as underpricing,
trading volume, and stock price volatility, are
influenced by a variety of exogenous factors
that are outside the direct influence of the lead
underwriter. A lead underwriter’s ability to im-
pact secondary market outcomes is largely a
function of the initial conditions it establishes in
the primary market.
In presenting the model depicted in Figure 3,
it is not our intent to imply that the four charac-
teristics of the deal network kernel we discuss
are the only factors that influence initial share
pricing and allocation decisions. The size and
asset base of the company, its record of profit-
ability, the availability of alternative offerings,
and so forth also have a direct impact on these
outcomes. Within the constraints imposed by
these other factors, however, we argue that vari-
ations in the characteristics of the deal network
kernel will shape IPO transaction outcomes in
predictable ways. While all four characteristics
are important, in this section we focus specifi-
cally on the impact of embedded and long-term
investors in the deal network. We do not develop
propositions about the impact of deal network
kernel size, because its impact on the IPO (i.e.,
the larger the deal network kernel, the lower the
concentration of shares is likely to be) is theo-
retically unremarkable. We also do not develop
specific propositions about the relationship be-
tween underwriting syndicate heterogeneity
and transaction outcomes, because we have
suggested that the underwriting syndicate is
used as a mechanism to manage the proportions
of long-term and embedded investors in the deal
network. The impact of syndicate heterogeneity
on IPO transaction outcomes, thus, is mediated
by these other deal network characteristics.
Research directly examining the relationship
between investor embeddedness with under-
writers and IPO valuation is sparse, although
recently scholars have suggested that investors
who participate regularly in an underwriter’s
deal networks (Hanley & Wilhelm, 1995), and
who provide the underwriter with information
during the price-setting process (Cornelli &
Goldreich, 2001), benefit from underwriter share
allocation decisions. The trust and information
sharing that exist between embedded under-
writers and investors reduce investor uncertain-
ties and increase their willingness to pay more
for the stock. Underwriters can prevail on inves-
tors with whom they have embedded relation-
ships to pay a slightly higher price for the stock
as a “favor” to the bank, with the implicit under-
standing that the favor will be reciprocated via
larger allocations of more desirable offerings in
the future.
Even though all investors receiving initial al-
locations pay the same price for a stock, Welch
(1992) has shown that once a few investors par-
ticipate in an offering at a particular price, other
investors will do so as well, creating a cascade
effect in the market. Thus, if a deal network
includes a larger proportion of embedded net-
work ties, the underwriter can use embedded
relationships with investors to prime the market
and fully subscribe a less attractive offering at a
higher price.
This sort of pricing reciprocity is not likely
when an offering is oversubscribed. An offering
is oversubscribed when there are more requests
for shares than there are shares available. In
highly anticipated offerings, especially during
hot markets, requests for shares may be several
times greater than the number of shares avail-
able (Cornelli & Goldreich, 2001). Adjusting
prices downward for high-demand offerings to
benefit embedded transaction partners places
an underwriter in direct conflict with the inter-
ests of the sellers. Also, since all buyers must
pay the same price for an offering, underwriters
do not have the same flexibility to reward par-
ticipation via price adjustments as they do via
share allocations. As a consequence, when an
IPO is oversubscribed, reciprocal behaviors on
the part of the investment bank must take the
form of share allocations rather than pricing
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adjustments (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989; Cornelli
& Goldreich, 2001). Embedded relationships with
investors are therefore likely to have little effect
on pricing for oversubscribed offerings.
Proposition 9: Increasing the propor-
tion of embedded investors in a deal
network kernel increases the valua-
tion of lower-demand offerings but
has no effect on the valuation of high-
demand offerings.
As noted previously, underwriters prefer to
place a significant proportion of the shares in an
offering with investors who possess long-term
time horizons and who can be relied on not to
flip the stock (Carter & Dark, 1993; Krigman et
al., 1999). This objective can be accomplished by
recruiting institutional investors who possess
the desired investment perspective and time ho-
rizon and/or by recruiting investors with whom
the underwriter has an embedded relationship.
Because they can be expected to hold their
shares, underwriters will grant long-term and
embedded investors larger share allocations. If
an underwriter has lower proportions of embed-
ded and long-term investors in its deal network,
it will disperse shares more widely by giving
smaller allocations to each investor so that op-
portunistic flipping of the stock by any one in-
vestor will have less of an impact on the vola-
tility of the stock’s price.
Proposition 10: The greater the propor-
tion of embedded investors and long-
term investors in the deal network, the
more concentrated the allocation of
shares is likely to be.
When considered together with Propositions 1
through 8, these last two propositions suggest
that large diversified underwriters will generate
the highest prices and most concentrated share
allocations for their IPOs. Smaller and more spe-
cialized underwriters will price their offerings
more conservatively and allocate shares more
broadly than the diversified banks because of
the concerns borne out of their greater depen-
dency on the market; their IPOs should also pro-
vide the greatest variation in pricing and share
allocation from deal to deal because of their
sensitivity to deal conditions. The IPOs led by
more peripheral banks will have the lowest
prices and share allocation concentrations; they
also will reflect the most consistency in deal
network design from deal to deal, because they
are the least likely to be affected by variations
in deal conditions and have the least ability to
respond to changes in deal conditions.
THE PROCESS OF MANAGING STRUCTURAL
HOLES: GENERALIZING TO OTHER MARKETS
The IPO brokering processes we described
above have their roots in Burt’s (1992) suggestion
that brokers bridge structural holes in transac-
tion networks. The theory of structural holes pro-
vides an important basis for conceptualizing the
role of brokers in market dynamics. At the same
time, we argued that the theory focuses primar-
ily on the opportunities created by bridging
holes in an existing social structure and, thus,
does not fully account for how brokers actively
create and manage structural holes or for the
role that broker interests and motivations play
in this process (Finlay & Coverdill, 2000). Broker-
ing is a complex and multidimensional activity,
and information transmission is only one com-
ponent of the broker’s role in consummating a
deal.
A structural analysis of brokers thus requires
supplemental theorizing about the brokering
process. Our conceptualization highlights the
proactive and network-building role of brokers
in mediated markets. Indeed, our model makes
it clear that the role of brokers in mediated mar-
kets is a constitutive one and that it is difficult to
separate the characteristics of deal networks
from the choices that brokers are making in re-
sponse to a variety of social and economic
forces operating at the time of a transaction.
Although we have used the applied context of
the U.S. IPO market to illustrate how brokers
design, build, and manage transaction net-
works, our arguments are generally applicable
to any number of markets in which transactions
are mediated by a third party.
Studies of mediated markets can be found
scattered throughout a variety of literature in
sociology, anthropology, and management. Ta-
ble 1 presents selected studies from this litera-
ture. Each mediated market is shaped by a par-
ticular purpose, an institutional context, and a
set of governance procedures that create a
unique venue for brokering activities. For exam-
ple, the desirability of recruiting investors with
long-term investment horizons as a way of sta-
bilizing the market for an IPO seems particu-
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larly bound up with the idiosyncrasies of the
stock market. Similarly, the nuances of syndi-
cate design seem especially dependent on the
existence of specific types of underwriters, such
as large and diversified investment banks, spe-
cialist banks, and peripheral dealers.
Nevertheless, whether it is the cocoa market
in Ghana (Southall, 1978), the Canadian tourism
market (Reimer, 1990), the market for employee
talent (Finlay & Coverdill, 2000), the residential
real estate market (Halpern, 1996), the New York
stock exchange (Abolafia, 1996), or purchases of
agricultural technology (McIntosh & Zey-Ferrell,
1986), our model of the brokering process sum-
marized in Figure 3 suggests that the network
architect’s situation can be described as a set of
background forces that influence the broker’s
motivations and capabilities as a market medi-
ator, a set of deal network attributes over which
the broker can exert at least some control, and a
set of transaction outcomes that are partially
determined by the broker’s network design
choices. As described in Table 1, within the
boundaries of a broker’s situation, the broker’s
accumulated social resources, the broker’s de-
pendence on the market as a source of profits,
and the exogenous properties of the deal, such
as the desirability of the assets being ex-
changed, are important in influencing how the
broker goes about building and managing a
given transaction network. Abstracting from our
IPO propositions, we can derive three generali-
zations about the influence of these variables on
brokering processes.
First, a broker’s ability to balance the compet-
ing interests of participants in a deal network is
heavily bound up with the social resources that
the broker has accumulated via past transac-
tions. Previous theorizing about the role of social
capital in market exchange (e.g., Baker, 1990;
Uzzi, 1997, 1999) has emphasized how social re-
sources lubricate existing exchange relation-
ships by facilitating the transmission of infor-
mation among transaction partners. While
information exchange is also an important con-
sideration in market mediation, our model of
brokering supplements the existing literature by
suggesting that social resources are important
in market making as well. Generally speaking,
the greater a broker’s social resources, the more
flexibility the broker has in building and man-
aging a given deal network.
By deploying social resources to adjust the
mix of participants in a deal, a broker exerts
control over transaction outcomes. Greater so-
cial resources afford the broker more choices in
recruiting deal participants and, thus, assist the
broker in striking appropriate tradeoffs among
participant objectives. At the same time, when
taken to the extreme, social resources can also
induce the broker to lose bargaining objectivity
and to favor some market participants over oth-
ers. Collusive behavior in mediated markets
sometimes occurs outside of accepted trading
practices and can be detrimental to the integrity
of the market as a whole. Such collusion is an-
other “dark side” of embedded social relation-
ships that has not been given much attention in
the existing literature.
The importance of social resources for broker-
ing activities is certainly evident in the litera-
ture on mediated markets. Broker reputation, the
ability to develop embedded ties, and the bro-
ker’s role as a crucial conduit of resources be-
tween one group and another are recurrent
themes in the literature.
For example, in their study of corporate head-
hunters, Finlay and Coverdill focus on the “id-
iosyncratic and personalized characteristics of
the exchange relationship—the degree of loy-
alty, trust and dependence between the head-
hunter and client” (2000: 378) and the significant
role that these factors play in determining how
and where headhunters focus their efforts. Fin-
lay and Coverdill suggest that a headhunter’s
reputation and ability to gain repeat business
are keys to his or her success in creating and
filling structural holes between clients and po-
tential job candidates.
Halpern (1996) describes how friendships
among real estate agents influenced their be-
havior during real estate transactions. She
found evidence suggesting that when the
agents representing the buyer and seller were
friends, the transaction was closed more quickly
and the transaction process was viewed as a
more positive experience. Halpern also found
that building a reputation as an honest and
competent agent was a long-term interest often
outweighing an agent’s shorter-term interests in
increasing the commissions from a sale.
Southall’s (1978) study of middlemen in the
Ghana cocoa industry is a rich description of the
complicated subnetworks of cocoa dealers of
varying status. Major dealers used these con-
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nections, as well as their ties to producers and
European merchants, not only to bridge struc-
tural holes but to keep these holes open even
when the merchants attempted to circumvent
the brokers and reduce their power.
Reimer (1990) discusses the importance of tour
operator ties to the service providers at vacation
destinations, and McIntosh and Zey-Ferrell
(1986) highlight the role that reputation and ex-
perience in the agricultural market played in
shaping bankers’ recommendations and loan
decisions supporting the purchase of new agri-
cultural technologies by farmers.
Second, a broker’s motivational orientation to-
ward a deal is largely controlled by the broker’s
dependence on that market as a source of finan-
cial or nonfinancial resources. Generally speak-
ing, the greater a broker’s dependence on a par-
ticular market for resources, the more likely the
broker will balance short-term and long-term
considerations in the consummation of a deal.
We have suggested that nondependent brokers
are more short-term oriented, less concerned
with expanding their social resources within
that market, and potentially more exploitative of
the market when short-term profit opportunities
arise. In contrast, dependent brokers use each
deal not only to extract short-term profits but
also to expand the social resources that will
enhance their brokering flexibility in the future.
Southall (1978), for example, notes that differ-
ent cocoa brokers varied in their involvement in
brokering as a line of business. Some brokers
were farmers who engaged in part-time cocoa
trading on a very limited scale, whereas other
brokers were larger operators with national
scope. Part-time brokers had very locally em-
bedded relationships and tended to sell their
products to larger brokers who sold exclusively
to European merchants. Southall’s description
implies that the part-time brokers were much
less dependent on brokering for their liveli-
hoods and, thus, engaged in little activity to
expand their relationships beyond their local
community.
In another example of varying dependence,
Halpern (1996) describes how realtors who were
more established in their market had more at
stake in maintaining their broker position. As a
result, established brokers demonstrated con-
cern for preserving and enhancing their social
relationships. Halpern notes that experienced
realtors focused more on building and leverag-
ing friendships with other agents than newer
agents, who instead placed a greater emphasis
on mastering the technical aspects of real estate
transactions. Halpern quotes one experienced
broker: “There’s no need to be highly technically
skilled. There’s always someone during a trans-
action that knows what they’re doing—the other
agent, a broker. The people part is more impor-
tant” (Halpern, 1996: 1536).
Research also suggests that the concept of
market dependence can be expanded fruitfully
to include not only the broker’s dependence on a
set of buyers and sellers but also the depen-
dence of the buyers and sellers on the broker. In
some markets, dependence on the broker is rel-
atively low, because alternative brokers are
available and broker competition can be orches-
trated (Finlay & Coverdill, 2000; Reimer, 1990). In
others, dependence on brokers for information or
resources is relatively high (Abolafia, 1996;
Halpern, 1996; McIntosh & Zey-Ferrell, 1986;
Southall, 1978), thus placing brokers in the posi-
tion of managing this dependence for their own
advantage.
Southall (1978) provides a fascinating account
of buyer and seller dependence in his discus-
sion of the actions taken by cocoa brokers to
preserve their profits. When cocoa producers
halted sales in 1930 in response to concerted
efforts by merchants to lower prices, brokers
successfully worked on behalf of the merchants
to end the stoppage, because it threatened their
own ability to earn profits. However, the same
brokers actively supported a later producer
holdup in 1937–1938. In the period between the
two holdups, the merchants’ dependence on bro-
kers had grown, along with the commissions
they paid to the brokers for their services. The
merchants tried, unsuccessfully, to reduce costs
by using their monopoly buying power to force
reductions in the excessive commissions paid to
brokers. Southall notes that “the difference be-
tween the earlier failure and the latter success
[of the production holdups] can be largely ex-
plained by the role of the brokers” (Southall,
1978: 206).
Abolafia’s (1996) description of the actions of
market-making specialists on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) during the 1930s further
illustrates how brokers sometimes leverage par-
ticipant dependencies for their own benefit.
Concerned with the growing power of special-
ists in the governance of the NYSE and its po-
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tential for abuse, then SEC chairman William O.
Douglas met with exchange leaders in 1938 to
discuss greater regulation of NYSE activities.
When Douglas suggested separating the spe-
cialists’ agent and dealer5 functions—an issue
of great importance to the specialists—the ex-
change president responded, “That’s fine. We’re
not opening on Monday” (Abolafia, 1996: 110).
It is interesting to note that as others’ depen-
dence on the brokers increased and the brokers
became more powerful, the brokers acted in an
increasingly opportunistic fashion to bolster
their own profits without considering the long-
term consequences of their actions on the mar-
ket. This pattern is similar to the behaviors of
some large and diversified underwriters dis-
cussed previously. It also illustrates the context-
dependent nature of self-interest and how social
context can shift an actor’s focus between long-
term and short-term concerns (e.g., Abolafia,
1996).
Third, exogenous deal conditions provide a
slate of important contextual factors to which a
broker must be sensitive and respond accord-
ingly by adjusting the characteristics of the deal
network kernel in appropriate ways. Halpern
(1996), for example, found that in “looser” mar-
kets realtors tended to be less competitive and
focused more on using friendship contacts than
in “tighter” markets, where housing was scarce
and demand was high. Finlay and Coverdill
(2000) found that deal conditions influenced
whether headhunters engaged in “reciprocal
opportunism” by poaching employees from one
client company and placing them with another.
Deal conditions were also found to impact head-
hunters’ decisions regarding whether to accept
an assignment, and how much effort to expend
on the search. Moreover, if a headhunter had a
particularly competent and desirable candi-
date— known as a “most placeable candi-
date”—the headhunter would make unsolicited
marketing calls on companies that had not ex-
plicitly engaged the headhunter but with whom
he or she wished to establish a new relationship.
Not all brokers are equally sensitive to deal
conditions, however, either because they lack
the motivation to adjust deal kernels in re-
sponse to deal conditions or because they do not
have the ability to do so. Generally speaking,
the greater a broker’s social resources and de-
pendence on the market, the more likely the
broker will adjust deal network characteristics
in response to changes in the favorability of deal
conditions. This generalization is an important
supplement to a purely structural analysis of
brokering, because it suggests that brokers are
often placed in the position of having to pack-
age particular configurations of participants in
response to deal conditions— configurations
that are dependent on a broker’s motivations
and abilities to generate interest in the transac-
tion. Brokers play a constitutive role in mediated
markets, and, as a consequence, such markets
cannot be fully understood without considering
the unique contributions and characteristics of
the brokers who design and manage them.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Adopting a network perspective offers a pow-
erful lens for exploring how social resources are
deployed in market transactions. Many impor-
tant contributions have been made by scholars
who have explored how network structures in-
fluence market functioning and outcomes (e.g.,
Baker, 1984; Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi,
1996; White, 1981). This article extends this liter-
ature by focusing on how transaction networks
are actually constructed in order to facilitate the
objectives of the network architect in mediated
markets, and how various attributes of deal net-
works influence transaction outcomes. Our dis-
cussion illustrates the complex ways that social
resources and dependence interact with the mo-
tivations of key actors, environmental condi-
tions, and transaction-specific characteristics to
shape the way transaction networks are built
and managed. Moreover, we have drawn theo-
retical concepts and empirical support from the
management, finance, and sociological litera-
ture and have attempted to integrate, rather
than counterpose, their implications.
One of the benefits of theorizing market con-
struction processes in the context of IPOs is the
wealth of publicly available data about an of-
fering (Marino, Castaldi, & Dollinger, 1989).
Methods and measures for capturing the repu-
5 Specialists can act both as “dealers,” trading shares for
their own account, and “agents,” buying and selling shares
for others. Serving these dual roles creates a potential con-
flict of interest whereby the specialists use information
about the other orders to self-deal and “front run” customers’
orders, buying or selling shares for their own accounts be-
fore fulfilling customers’ requests.
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tation of key participants in the process are well
developed (e.g., Bushee, 1998; Carter, Dark, &
Singh, 1998; Podolny, 1994), and it is possible to
construct network measures from several sec-
ondary sources, such as SEC disclosures of in-
stitutional investor holdings, IPO prospectuses,
and offering tombstones. In-depth qualitative
studies, both of companies going through the
IPO process and investment banks as they un-
derwrite offerings, can also yield important in-
sights that cannot be captured through the use
of archival data alone (e.g., Eccles & Crane, 1988;
Malone, 1991).
However, the arguments presented in this ar-
ticle also can be extended in important ways by
conducting comparative studies that cross mar-
ket boundaries. As we noted previously, medi-
ated markets vary in idiosyncratic ways, and the
interaction of broker social resources, market
dependence, and deal conditions is likely to
play out in subtly different ways, depending on
the market context. Three market characteristics
seem to be especially important in shaping
these interactions: (1) the extent and nature of
the institutional governance structures present
in a particular market (Abolafia, 1996), (2) the
opportunities for social enforcement of trust
(Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993), and (3) the exis-
tence of competition among multiple network
architects (Finlay & Coverdill, 2000). Compara-
tive studies examining how these three factors
shape brokering processes in different markets
seem to be especially desirable.
Formal regulatory institutions (e.g., govern-
mental agencies, industry associations and
boards of conduct, etc.) often have a significant
impact on the way brokers design and manage
deal networks. While the IPO market is regu-
lated by the SEC and the national exchanges on
which IPO stocks are listed, other markets, such
as the bond trading market (Abolafia, 1996), are
more self-regulating. Still others, such as the
employee placement market, are not subject to
much regulation of any kind (Finlay & Coverdill,
2000). On the one hand, Abolafia (1996) suggests
that brokers in more regulated markets may be
somewhat less apt to engage in self-serving and
opportunistic behaviors than brokers in unregu-
lated markets, implying that different gover-
nance structures create different perceived
tradeoffs between short-term and long-term
benefits and costs. On the other hand, formal
market regulations might simply create new
possibilities and incentives for broker opportun-
ism. Future theorizing and research examining
the linkages between market regulatory institu-
tions and broker behavior would be useful.
Even when formal institutional structures are
weak, trust can be promoted and opportunism
curtailed through social sanctions—what Portes
and Sensenbrenner (1993) call enforceable trust.
When market transactions take place within
close-knit social groups, such as Dominican and
Cuban neighborhoods (Portes & Sensenbrenner,
1993), rotating credit societies in Asian commu-
nities (Geertz, 1962), or Jewish diamond mer-
chants in New York (Coleman, 1988), the threat of
social ostracism from the community is gener-
ally sufficient to curb opportunistic behavior.
Brokers serving as network architects in these
dense social contexts are likely to face different
sets of motivations and concerns, and different
brokering tradeoffs, than network architects in
less tightly bound social environments. Further
research exploring the role of enforceable trust
and relational density in brokering processes
would be desirable.
Finally, competition among brokers often cre-
ates dynamics that make it easier or more diffi-
cult for brokers to control their deal network
kernels. Competition does not play a significant
role in the IPO market, since competition to be
selected as the lead underwriter occurs prior to
the construction of the deal network kernel. As
Finlay and Coverdill (2000) point out, however,
not all mediated markets operate in this fashion.
In the employee placement market, for example,
the client firm will usually contact multiple
headhunters for an engagement and encourage
them to compete throughout the placement pro-
cess. Explicating how competition among bro-
kers impacts deal network construction could
also be a fruitful direction for future theorizing
and empirical research.
Following these research leads should go a
long way toward fleshing out a generalized the-
ory of brokering processes. Comparative re-
search on mediated markets will permit the si-
multaneous appreciation of the idiosyncrasies
of each market context, while also calling atten-
tion to the interaction of the key underlying vari-
ables of broker social resources, market depen-
dence, and deal conditions in shaping the
tradeoffs made by brokers when designing and
managing deal networks. We believe that our
choice to focus on the details of the IPO market
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in conjunction with generalizations that apply to
other mediated markets is a useful first step in
this direction. Our hope is that our combined
approach encourages additional comparative
endeavors by scholars interested in understand-
ing the social construction of markets.
APPENDIX: THE PROCESS OF TAKING A
COMPANY PUBLIC
Within an IPO deal network, the offering
firm’s auditor, attorneys, and underwriter pro-
vide the first line of fiduciary assurance that all
material information affecting the performance
of the company in the near future has been in-
cluded in the prospectus. The SEC provides the
second line of fiduciary assurance by verifying
the information included in the prospectus prior
to granting the company the right to issue stock.
Other key participants in the network are early
investors in the company and the institutional
and individual investors who purchase the stock
at the initial share price.
The first step in going public is drafting the
registration statement to be filed with the SEC
(Husick & Arrington, 1998). Drafting a registra-
tion statement is a group activity combining the
efforts of the company’s executives, the under-
writers, both outside counsels, and the auditors
(Husick & Arrington, 1998). In conjunction with
the SEC filing, a “red herring” prospectus is
prepared for distribution to potential investors.
The red herring prospectus includes all relevant
information about the offering except the initial
price of the stock and the number of shares to be
offered. Filing with the SEC also triggers the
firm’s “quiet period,” which expires twenty-five
days after the effective date of the offering (Hu-
sick & Arrington, 1998). During this period, the
company is not permitted to grant interviews or
to otherwise promote the company in any way. If
the SEC feels that the company is promoting its
stock during the quiet period, it may object to
or even postpone the offering. The company is
permitted, however, to conduct “road shows”
around the country, in which the underwriters
and top management team meet with investors,
analysts, and potential members of the under-
writing syndicate. The company is prohibited in
these meetings from presenting information not
included in the prospectus, but it may clarify
issues raised in the prospectus and respond to
audience questions.
It is during the registration period that the
underwriter must determine the offering price of
the stock (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989). The under-
writer first contacts various institutional inves-
tors and determines the number of shares these
investors are willing to purchase at various
price levels. The underwriter then uses this in-
formation to assess how the market initially val-
ues the company and to identify potential inves-
tors. Once the SEC is satisfied that all relevant
information about the company has been pre-
sented in a clear and accurate way, the com-
pany is permitted to file a final pricing amend-
ment that includes the stock’s price, the number
of shares to be sold, the underwriter’s commis-
sion, and the effective date on which the com-
pany has the right to offer its stock to the public.
The company signs the underwriting agreement
with its investment bank twenty-four hours be-
fore the effective date and sets the offering price
of the stock. The company’s stock is offered to
the public shortly after the IPO goes effective.
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